Peter Anyang' Nyong'o
Former Minister for Planning and National Development
Introduction
The emergence of what can be referred to as the third chapter of the Kenya Government's history of economic policy planning and the challenges that it has faced in the course of implementation, date from the ascension of a new government with the historic elections of December 2002. This election ushered the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government into power. A great effort has since been directed at creating an enabling environment for rapid economic growth and development in keeping with the covenant that the then new government made with the people of Kenya during the electioneering period.
For the NARC government, it was evident that the starting point had to be deepening stakeholder consultations with the private sector, the civil society, and development partners as well as with a cross section of ordinary members of the Kenyan public who had assured their victory. All this began early in 2003 and culminated in the preparation of a policy document called the
Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (the ERSWEC), which became popularly known by its shorter name,
the ERS. The President of Kenya, H.E. Mwai Kibaki, officially launched
the ERS, on June 18th 2003.
The ERS was considered a major economic policy document for the new government, meant to guide the economic planning process for the first five years of the administration. It drew ideas from the NARC Manifesto; its Post Election Action Programme (PEAP); the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (the PRSP) released in 2001; the various National Development Plans that had been developed over the years; and from various sectoral policy documents as well as sessional papers that have been part of the history of economic policy planning in Kenya for the past forty years.
A NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS FOR POLICY MAKING
Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation gave birth to what now goes by the full title,
Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007 (IP-ERS), released in May 2004. The
IP-ERS is a product of further consultation, revision and refinement of the ERS, which brought in views from a variety of key stakeholders. That entire process of consultation for purposes of economic policy making needs to be written, not only to record an instructive piece of history, but also because it signals two fundamental issues. Firstly, the fundamental policy change that NARC incorporated in its mode of operation and which modern day governments cannot afford to ignore: the need for consultation and due regard to the diversity of views. These deepen our own democratic process and credentials. Secondly, it signalled the challenges involved in the process of seeking a national policy consensus.
It needs to be borne in mind that the Government of Kenya subscribed to the World Bank's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programme in the year 2000 and embarked on the preparation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (the PRSP) through wide-ranging consultations and dialogue. This was even before NARC came into the scene and was aimed at building consensus on priority actions and activities necessary for economic growth and poverty reduction.
The PRSP process itself also had a number of incarnations. The
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IP-RSP) released in 2001, involved only limited consultations at the national level. Subsequently, consultations followed a three-tier approach at the national, provincial and district levels with stakeholders that included the Private Sector, Civil Society, Development Partners and local communities. This approach led to the formation of a National Steering Committee of stakeholders charged with the responsibility of spearheading consultations and ensuring inclusion at all levels.
The consultations were unique because they covered the thematic areas that are traditionally left out in mainstream sector working groups, but which are very important for stimulating general growth. The consultations went down to the divisions, locations and villages. Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) were conducted in ten (10) sampled districts. The District PRSP reports and PPA reports, together with inputs from the Sector Working Groups (SWGs), were synthesised into the PRSP (2001-2004). This formed an important baseline for the NARC government's own set of interventions.
When the new government took office at the end of 2002, it immediately decided on the process of preparing its own 'Economic Recovery Strategy' (ERS) policy document that would focus on reviving the economy and creating employment while also taking on board any important lessons drawn from the previous history of policy making. As already mentioned,
The ERS process was a consultative one involving key stakeholders such as parliamentarians, and for the first time trade unions; professionals from within and outside Kenya; financial institutions; industrialists as well as representatives from the Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASALs). Also involved in the process were Kenya's development partners; civil society representatives and government officials. It was committed to any important lessons drawn from the PRSP history and it was an immense undertaking.
THE NECESSITY FOR PRIORITISATION
Once the
ERS policy proposal became a public document, it soon became apparent that there was a need to cost it and plan more effectively for its implementation. The point worth appreciating here is simply that, policy documents, however well articulated, represent only a small fraction of the actual work that any government needs to have done. Indeed, one of the earliest lessons one learns as a Minister for Planning in a developing country is simply that citizens think in terms of, and require, concrete services; real jobs and improvements in their overall welfare and that they can get very impatient with the most erudite of policy positions which are not backed by concrete implementation. As should be apparent by the end of this article, this remains a major problem and therefore a challenge to our government, whether now or in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it was to this challenge that the NARC government responded, leading, first to the development of what we called an Interim Investment Programme. The very idea of supporting our policy with a concrete 'Investment Programme' was in our view, a historic novelty in Kenya.
The Interim Investment Programme document, released late in 2003, gave us an opportunity to begin thinking in very practical terms, to consider the resource needs for implementing programmes such as were envisaged in
the ERS. The figure that our economists came up with at the time was a colossal 706 billion Kenya shillings!
The Interim Investment Programme was tabled and very candidly discussed at our first National Investment Conference in November 2003. It also formed the basis of discussions at the Donor Consultative Group (DCG) meeting held in November 2003. In general terms, it was a document that was well received and, by most accounts, it led to unprecedented donor pledges amounting to some US$4.1billion. At the beginning of the new year in 2004, another round of consultations began with a prioritisation workshop (January). The 'logical matrix of objectives, outcomes, costs and the enabling activities' for
the ERS in line with sector objectives are outcomes of this
prioritisation workshop. The release and subsequent national endorsement of the
Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003-2007) show the seeds of broad participation. The result is a document that attempts to highlight national economic policy priorities while offering a logical framework to facilitate expedient reference during the challenging phases of actual implementation. Perhaps, its most important aspect lies in the fact that the prioritisation workshops that were held between January and March 2004 enabled the government to scale down the cost of implementing
the ERS policies and programmes from the initial Kshs 706 billion, to a figure of about Kshs 340 billion!
THE CHALLENGES, THE PROSPECTS AND THE ROLE OF A POLICY FRAMEWORK
One of the most significant challenges likely to confront an enthusiastic government is, first and foremost, that it often finds itself a prisoner of history. In our case, the NARC administration came to power after forty years of the single party rule mentality and its record of gross mismanagement, notoriety and general misrule. It is a matter of common knowledge that under those monolithic systems of government – epitomised in Kenya by the KANU regime – good governance and the rule of law had notoriously taken flight while social menaces such as corruption had become endemic. As is now fairly well recorded, the NARC regime very early in its watch, came face to face with 'the fighting back' syndrome of corruption, as well as other manifestations of deeply rooted forms of malfeasance – issues that mere consultations were ill equipped to deal with.
On the other hand, consultation as an aspect of the democratic process, is not without its problems. One of the most important retrospective comments that can be made about the entire process of consultation within the ERS experience is that a national planning exercise is a huge task. Consultation with one sector does not in any way guarantee a common understanding even in that sector, let alone the many others that occupy the expanded democratic space. The reality is that it remains a challenge to determine who the authentic representatives of every sector are, and whether or not they are products of mutually agreed and inclusive democratic processes.
Quite interestingly, a consensus with one sector can easily became the very bone of contention with another, while other sectors allege exclusion. A recurring example is encountered with Civil Society, where one very soon contends with the reality that civil society is itself a huge and highly cleavaged society with its own internal differences. The same can be said of the Private Sector and even the wider public. The challenge that will be with us for some time in this respect is this: How widely can we consult when we are also under pressure to deliver, and who really speaks for who, when?
Box 2.1: Interview with Prof P. Anyang' Nyong'o, Minister for Planning and National Development
Q. | Honourable Minister, can you comment on the slow pace of the ICT Policy process in the country, taking cognisance of the fact that there is already an existing e-government strategy? |
Ans. | The ministry is pressing for a policy to support technology transfer and we have emphasised that you cannot have good e-government without an ICT Policy. Two things, elements if you like, characterised the environment before this government. There was fear of ICTs. ICTs were the domain of government and few individuals in government wished to open up an ICT debate because it would threaten the monopoly of government. From monopoly comes rent seeking and tremendous control. This control would be jeopardised if competition was allowed into the market. The government would loose control of licensing, frequency allocation,....of communications. |
| These two elements, control and monopoly, stopped a progressive discussion of ICTs in the country. The previous government feared e-government, you could not have an e-mail account in government. The other problem is procurement, which is still a problem affecting all policy implementations because of its slow and cumbersome nature. There are too many busybodies. |
Q. | You mention busy bodies. How do you balance interests when making policies? |
Ans. | It is very difficult to pursue political democracy and economic reforms at the same time. Russia did not succeed. India is one of the few examples of countries that have attempted to do this but it is big, with many states and not all of them are at the same situation. Political democracy allows spaces, which some groups will take and seize as opportunities to pursue their own unscrupulous aims that may not be in tandem with the progressive and legitimate aims of a reforming government. For example, a landlord might say it is his right to charge high rents when the government is committed to a policy of affordable housing, which includes lowering rents. |
| Economic reforms become bogged down because of all kinds of interests. All this stakeholder talk and consultation can delay policy making considerably. When, for instance, does consultation end and implementation begin? The consultation culture and industry and their support structures in NGOs exist because of this and the very bankrupt pro-poor ideology. |
Q. | Tell me about the Economic Recovery and Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation. It involved extensive consultations. |
Ans: | The ERS was a huge undertaking. We needed a paradigm shift from PRSP to economic recovery. The aim of the Kenyan government was not to reduce poverty but to create wealth and employment. We wanted to do good things that we could have done in the past. |
| Kenya has lost opportunities for development because the environment was polluted by bad governance. We needed to start afresh! We had a unique historical moment for fast tracking economic growth. So we looked at the PRSP, and used what was good in it. |
| It was time-consuming and energy intensive. We had meetings every morning in addition to the public workshops. It is expensive, and would have been impossible if I hadn't got support from UNDP. |
Q. | One last question Honourable Minister. How have you handled equality in policy; for instance in gender? |
Ans: | I don't think we have dealt with it. It is difficult to do because of culture. It requires a cultural revolution. We have some formulae so this is good but not sufficient. |
Interview conducted in the Minister's office, Ministry of Planning and National Development, Nairobi on Saturday, 23rd April 2005. |
CONCLUSION
This short piece has provided only a brief of the information available in bigger volumes in many policy papers of the Government of Kenya. The first major evaluation of our performance in so far as policy making and policy implementation is concerned, can be found in
the Annual Progress Report of the IP-ERS -2003-2004 prepared by a newly created Monitoring and Evaluation department. It is hoped that this novelty (Monitoring and Evaluation) will help keep our government on track, especially with respect to tracking development expenditure on one hand and monitoring the wide disconnect between policy (formation) and implementation, as well as reconcile budgetary provisions with actual projects that benefit the majority of Kenyans. As minister overseeing this rather exhilarating process in which we are virtually re-engineering government processes, one must remain convinced and optimistic that we have formulated a commensurate antidote to poor policy making and weak implementation a characteristic of the past.