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Tuesday, December 21, 2010

E-commerce dealers turn to mobile phone

Kenyans’ resistance to use of plastic money has seen providers of cash-less payment systems leapfrog credit cards to use of mobile phone based e-commerce.
Companies that have e-payment platforms such as I&M Bank, JamboPay, PesaPal and I-pay say the uptake of cards for electronic commerce has been slow, even after the law was changed last year to introduce online transactions.
This has forced the players to integrate their systems to mobile phone operators’ platforms to tap more customers.
There are an estimated 13 million Kenyans with access to money transfer services compared to 2.2 million Visa debit card holders and 111,000 credit card holders as at end of 2009.
“E-payments in most countries, especially in the West, evolved from cash to cards to mobile but Kenya almost shot from cash to mobile in a decade,” said Danson Muchemi, business development director at JamboPay.
Agosta Liko, the chief executive of Pesapal, said the firm had to factor in the high use of mobile phones in Kenya while setting up their e-payment system.
“We have started from zero and are designing it as per market needs. This is unlike in other countries whose systems were designed as per Visa specifications.”
Faith Nyoike of I-pay said mobile payments have helped to localise the concept of e-payment, which has for a long time been viewed as a reserve for high income earners.
Credit cards
“People have always been scared of credit cards, the fact that they have confidence in mobile payments makes it easier to pull them to online payment and e-commerce.”
JamboPay, which deals with both mobile payments and card based payments, said the uptake and returns from mobile payments has been higher than card supported transactions.
Mr Muchemi said Visa credit and debit cards payments are popular for conference, events booking, and in the hotel and tourism industry.
A major limitation for mobile phone based transactions, however, is that they are not yet in use in international payments.
This is because most countries are still lagging behind on mobile payments.
Local commercial banks have been slow to adopt online payment services. I & M Bank is the only lender with a license from Visa International for facilitating online payments.

Firm prices promise good coffee year

Coffee earnings grew by 27 per cent over the first eight months of the year supported by firm prices, signaling a good run for farmers.

Provisional data by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) shows earnings from the commodity to August stood at about Sh10 billion compared to the Sh7.35 billion over a similar period last year.

The performance is attributed to strong prices in international outlets.

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“The international markets have been up for much of this year and the prices have been good locally too,” Daniel Mbithi, an official at the Nairobi Coffee Exchange (NCE) said.

Latest projections by the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) showed producers worldwide were headed for higher earnings this year due to adverse weather conditions and a rise in production costs, which have cut global supplies.

The shortage is reflected by the fact that opening stocks in producing countries for the 2010/11 crop year are expected to fall below 12 million bags, the lowest level in recorded history.

The effects of the market conditions have been reflected in the local scene because pricing at the NCE largely tracks leading international outlets such as the New York Futures Market.

Besides, the Kenya Meteorological department expects dry weather in the country in the coming months — a situation that could further affect coffee stocks.

In a forecast for the final quarter for 2010, the department predicts depressed rainfall conditions across most parts of the country.

“Unfortunately, only a few will enjoy the bounty locally because production has not been good in terms of numbers,” Mr Mbithi said.

Some growers, unhappy about widespread mismanagement in the once vibrant sub-sector, have given up on coffee production and taken on the now lucrative real estate business.

Several coffee farms mainly in Central Kenya have been cleared to pave way for property development investment viewed to have bigger returns.

Last month, the Coffee Board said earnings grew by more than a half to Sh16 billion in the 2009 crop year driven by strong pricing locally and abroad, helping to offset the impact of adverse weather on output.

Production dropped from 50,000 tonnes in the 2008/2009 season to 40,000 tonnes, but farmers’ earnings were boosted by prices of Sh70 per kilogramme of cherry on average.

“Prices were firmly supported by positive global fundamentals,” Ms Loise Njeru, the managing director of Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK), told a media briefing in Nairobi.

Overview of Kenya today


The area that now comprises Kenya came under British domination in the 1890s, though it was not declared an official Crown colony until 1920. Under British hegemony (complete domination), a racially stratified economy was created, with European settlers controlling a large segment of the fertile land and managing nascent industries, while the African indigenous population worked as laborers on cash-crop plantations and in factories. Indians, occupying a status somewhere between the Europeans and Africans, formed a petty-capitalist class of artisans, clerks, and merchants. By and large, the colonial economy was characterized by settler control of farming lands (settler-economy), with tea and coffee acting as the major export crops designated for sale in European markets abroad.
Following the emergence of various nationalist movements throughout the 1950s, in addition to a series of rebellions (the Mau Mau) against British rule, Kenya was granted independence in December 1963. Under the subsequent rule of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), headed by President Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya experienced significant economic growth throughout the 1960s. Although KANU, a self-proclaimed African socialist party, pursued various socialistic policies— including government control of agricultural marketing boards, state ownership of certain industries, and import-substitution —the economy under Kenyatta was more or less mixed.
In 1980, a growing balance of payments deficit caused by declining terms of trade (international prices for agricultural commodities greatly outweighed by prices for capital goods ) and high international oil prices, compelled Kenya to borrow heavily from the World Bank. The latter issued a second large-scale loan to Kenya in 1982, with both the first and second loans being subjected to numerous conditionalities (requirements). Such conditionalities centered on increasing the role of the private sector in the economy while concomitantly decreasing the role of the government. In particular, the conditionalities—collectively labeled Structural Adjustment Packages (SAPs)—emphasized trade liberalization and gradual dissolution of government marketing boards that controlled purchasing and selling of agricultural commodities.
Kenya's slow progress towards implementing agricultural conditionalities, in addition to the widespread use of public resources by government and parastatal officials for private gain (corruption), prompted many bilateral donors and the major international financial institutions to severely criticize KANU throughout the early 1990s. Inefficient and corrupt parastatals were singled out as being particularly draining to the country's treasury, and thus a major factor behind deficit and debt problems. Economic performance in the 1990s declined severely, and the average annual GDP growth rate, which stood at 6.5 percent between 1960 to 1980, fell to 2 percent between 1990 to 1999. In August 1993, inflation temporarily reached a record high of 100 percent. Five years later, in 1998, the unemployment rate soared to 50 percent.
Both the IMF and the World Bank suspended structural adjustment programs in 1997, as a result of KANU's failure to implement governance conditionalities designed primarily to curb corruption and promote sound economic policy. In July 2000, however, Kenya signed a long-awaited 3-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) with the IMF, a development that is expected to normalize relations with the World Bank and various bilateral donors. The PRGF, a direct relative of the SAPs, sets out some of the most detailed conditions ever agreed to by a national government.
The Kenyan economy continues to be dominated by agriculture, with tea, coffee, horticultural products, and petroleum products acting as the country's major exports. Export partners, in turn, include Uganda, Tanzania, the UK, Egypt, and Germany. Tourism is the second largest contributor to foreign exchange, while agriculture is the first. Kenya's major imports include machinery and transportation equipment, petroleum products, and iron and steel, most of which are imported from the UK, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Japan, Germany, and India. Due, in large part, to the uneven terms of trade between Kenya's agricultural exports and higher value-added imports, the country runs a significant balance of trade deficit. This means that Kenya must borrow heavily to finance imports, hence the various SAPs. In 1998, Kenya's total external debt stood at US$7 billion. In addition to commercial loans, the country also receives large amounts of economic aid from various international organizations and bilateral donors. In 1997, for instance, Kenya received a total of US$457 million in aid.
A severe drought from 1999 to 2000 compounded Kenya's problems, causing water and energy rationing and reducing agricultural output. As a result, GDP contracted by 0.2% in 2000. The IMF, which had resumed loans in 2000 to help Kenya through the drought, again halted lending in 2001 when the government failed to institute several anticorruption measures. Despite the return of strong rains in 2001, weak commodity prices, endemic corruption, and low investment limited Kenya's economic growth to 1.2%. Growth lagged at 1.1% in 2002 because of erratic rains, low investor confidence, meager donor support, and political infighting up to the elections. In the key December 2002 elections, Daniel Arap MOI's 24-year-old reign ended, and a new opposition government took on the formidable economic problems facing the nation. After some early progress in rooting out corruption and encouraging donor support, the KIBAKI government was rocked by high-level graft scandals in 2005 and 2006. In 2006, the World Bank and IMF delayed loans pending action by the government on corruption. The international financial institutions and donors have since resumed lending, despite little action on the government's part to deal with corruption. Post-election violence in early 2008, coupled with the effects of the global financial crisis on remittance and exports, reduced estimated GDP growth below 2% in 2008 and 2009.
GDP (purchasing power parity):
$63.52 billion (2009 est.)

$62.39 billion (2008 est.)
$61.35 billion (2007 est.)
GDP (official exchange rate):
$30.21 billion (2009 est.)
GDP - real growth rate:
1.8% (2009 est.)
1.7% (2008 est.)
7% (2007 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP):
$1,600 (2009 est.)
$1,600 (2008 est.)
$1,700 (2007 est.)
GDP - composition by sector:
agriculture: 21.4%
industry: 16.3%
services: 62.3% (2009 est.)
Labor force:
17.47 million (2009 est.)
Labor force - by occupation:
agriculture: 75%
Unemployment rate:
40% (2008 est.)
40% (2001 est.)
Population below poverty line:
50% (2000 est.)
Household income or consumption by percentage share:
lowest 10%: 1.8%
highest 10%: 37.8% (2005)
Distribution of family income - Gini index:
42.5 (2008)
44.9 (1997)
Investment (gross fixed):
21.5% of GDP (2009 est.)
Budget:
revenues: $6.858 billion
expenditures: $8.759 billion (2009 est.)
Public debt:
54.1% of GDP (2009 est.)
60.1% of GDP (2008 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices):
20.5% (2009 est.)
26.2% (2008 est.)
Central bank discount rate:
NA% (31 December 2008)
Commercial bank prime lending rate:
14.02% (31 December 2008)
13.34% (31 December 2007)
Stock of money:
$6.068 billion (31 December 2008)
$5.912 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of quasi money:
$5.468 billion (31 December 2008)
$6.464 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of domestic credit:
$10.83 billion (31 December 2008)
$10.67 billion (31 December 2007)
Market value of publicly traded shares:
$10.92 billion (31 December 2008)
$13.39 billion (31 December 2007)
$11.38 billion (31 December 2006)
Agriculture - products:
tea, coffee, corn, wheat, sugarcane, fruit, vegetables; dairy products, beef, pork, poultry, eggs
Industries:
small-scale consumer goods (plastic, furniture, batteries, textiles, clothing, soap, cigarettes, flour), agricultural products, horticulture, oil refining; aluminum, steel, lead; cement, commercial ship repair, tourism

Industrial production growth rate:
2% (2009 est.)

Electricity - production:
5.223 billion kWh (2008 est.)
Electricity - consumption:
4.863 billion kWh (2008 est.)


Electricity - exports:
58.3 million kWh (2007 est.)


Electricity - imports:
22.5 million kWh (2007 est.)


Oil - production:
0 bbl/day (2008 est.)


Oil - consumption:
75,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)


Oil - exports:
7,270 bbl/day (2007 est.)


Oil - imports:
80,530 bbl/day (2007 est.)


Oil - proved reserves:
0 bbl (1 January 2009 est.)


Natural gas - production:
0 cu m (2008 est.)


Natural gas - consumption:
0 cu m (2008 est.)


Natural gas - exports:
0 cu m (2008 est.)


Natural gas - imports:
0 cu m (2008 est.)


Natural gas - proved reserves:
0 cu m (1 January 2009 est.)


Current account balance:
$-1.859 billion (2009 est.)

$-1.978 billion (2008 est.)

Exports:
$4.479 billion (2009 est.)

$5.04 billion (2008 est.)

Exports - commodities:
tea, horticultural products, coffee, petroleum products, fish, cement

Exports - partners:
UK 10%, Netherlands 9.2%, Uganda 9%, Tanzania 8.7%, US 6.3%, Pakistan 5.6% (2008)

Imports:
$9.031 billion (2009 est.)

$10.69 billion (2008 est.)

Imports - commodities:
machinery and transportation equipment, petroleum products, motor vehicles, iron and steel, resins and plastics

Imports - partners:
India 14.1%, UAE 11.5%, China 10%, Saudi Arabia 8%, South Africa 5.7%, Japan 5.1% (2008)

Reserves of foreign exchange and gold:
$2.601 billion (31 December 2009 est.)

$2.879 billion (31 December 2008 est.)

Debt - external:
$7.729 billion (31 December 2009 est.)

$7.855 billion (31 December 2008 est.)

Stock of direct foreign investment - at home:
$2.053 billion (31 December 2009 est.)

$2.541 billion (31 December 2008 est.)

Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad:
$42 million (31 December 2009 est.)

$12.4 million (31 December 2008 est.)

Exchange rates:
Kenyan shillings (KES) per US dollar - 78.042 (2009), 68.358 (2008), 68.309 (2007), 72.101 (2006), 75.554 (2005)





Global targets, local ingenuity

In ten years, the living conditions of the poor have been improving—but not necessarily because of the UN’s goals

EVEN at 70, Jiyem, an Indonesian grandmother, gets up in the small hours to cook and collect firewood for her impoverished household. Her three-year-old grandson is malnourished. Nobody in her family has ever finished primary school. Her ramshackle house lacks electricity; the toilet is a hole in the ground; the family drinks dirty water. Asked about her notion of well-being by researchers from Oxford University, Jiyem said, “I cannot picture what well-being means.”
The sort of deprivation Jiyem describes remains widespread. The United Nations reckons that in 2008 over a quarter of children in the developing world were underweight, a sixth of people lacked access to safe drinking water, and just under half used insanitary toilets or none at all. But while these figures are disquieting, a smaller fraction of people were affected than was the case two decades ago. So such data also indicate the world’s progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of targets adopted by world leaders at the UN ten years ago.
The leaders gave themselves 15 years to reach the goalposts set in 2000. Two-thirds of that time is up. This week they returned to the UN for another meeting. Few, if any, of them have close experience of poverty. So the MDG exercise has at least made them spend three days discussing matters they might prefer to ignore. It has also helped to shift the debate away from how much is being spent on development towards how much is being achieved.
But few go as far as Ban Ki-Moon, the UN secretary-general, who recently called the goals “a milestone in international co-operation” that had helped “hundreds of millions of people around the world.” Talking up the MDGs is, of course, part of Mr Ban’s job. And there has indeed been progress on many fronts (see table 2). But it is hard to assign much credit to the exercise itself.
Take the goal of halving the poverty rate from its 1990 level by 2015. The World Bank reckons that in 1990 46% of the developing world’s population fell below the internationally accepted poverty line of $1.25 a day at purchasing-power parity. By 2005 the rate had fallen to 27% and, despite a slowdown in progress in the past couple of years, it is now probably lower still. A global halving by 2015 seems well within reach. Yet this “victory” is mainly due to a drop in China’s poverty rate from 60% in 1990 to 16% in 2005. Because China and India accounted for over 62% of the planet’s poor in 1990, changes to the world’s poverty rate depend heavily on their performance. A global goal is therefore a poor way to give the governments of smaller countries an incentive to tackle poverty.
Alison Evans of Britain’s Overseas Development Institute (ODI) reckons that the MDGs have come to be seen as applying to each developing country. But it is hard to track performance at country level: 28 of the poorest countries have recorded poverty rates for only one year between 1990 and 2008, according to a tally by researchers at the Centre for Global Development, a think-tank in Washington, DC. This makes any judgments about their progress mere guesswork. (This caveat does not apply with equal force to the global target, because China and India have enough data to make their progress measurable.)
The ODI reckons that 15 poor countries have already met the goal of halving the poverty rate. And perennial pessimists about Africa’s prospects may be surprised to know that the list of the top ten countries ranked by the average annual decline in the poverty rate includes six in Africa: the Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Guinea.
But lack of data aside, there is something odd about setting uniform targets such as “cutting child mortality by two-thirds”, which means that some countries must do much more to avoid being classed as failures than others. Niger is a case in point. Between 1990 and 2007 it cut the number of children per 1,000 who died before their fifth birthday from 304 to 176. This was the biggest absolute reduction of any country in the world. But Niger is still judged “off-track” to meet its target, because continuing at the current rate will still result in a reduction of slightly below two-thirds. Its government may well find the MDG exercise mildly discouraging.

Money’s limits

The goal-setting exercise has further pitfalls. Too often, the goals are reduced to working out how much money is needed to meet a particular target and then berating governments for not spending enough. Yet the countries that have made most progress in cutting poverty have largely done so not by spending public money, but by encouraging faster economic growth. China is the most obvious example. The best performers in Africa, too, are those that have managed to speed up growth. As Shanta Devarajan, the World Bank’s chief economist for Africa, points out, growth does not just make more money available for social spending. It also increases the demand for such things as schooling, and thus helps meet other development goals. Yet the goals, as drawn up, made no mention of economic growth.
Of course, as India’s dismal record on child malnutrition demonstrates (see article), growth by itself does not solve all the problems of the poor. It is also clear that while money helps, how it is spent and what it is spent on are enormously important. For instance, campaigners often ask for more to be spent on primary education. But throughout the developing world teachers on the public payroll are often absent from school. Teacher-absenteeism rates are around 20% in rural Kenya, 27% in Uganda and 14% in Ecuador. In Rajasthan in northern India, nurses who were supposed to be staffing primary health clinics were found to be at work only 12% of the time over an 18-month period.
In any case, money that is allocated for such services rarely reaches its intended recipients. A study found that 70% of the money allocated for drugs and supplies by the Ugandan government in 2000 was lost to “leakage”; in Ghana, 80% was siphoned off. Montek Ahluwalia, of India’s Planning Commission, said last year that he reckoned only 16% of the resources earmarked for the poor under the country’s subsidised food distribution scheme ever reached them. Money needs to be spent, therefore, not merely on building more schools or hiring more teachers, but on getting them to do what they are paid for, and preventing resources from disappearing somewhere between the central government and their supposed destination.
The good news is that policy experiments carried out by governments, NGOs, academics and international institutions are slowly building up a body of evidence about methods that work. A large-scale evaluation in Andhra Pradesh in southern India has shown, for example, that performance pay for teachers is three times as effective at raising pupils’ test scores as the equivalent amount spent on school supplies. In Rajasthan, teachers were paid only on showing a date-stamped photograph to prove they had been in class on a given day. This led not just to a massive decline in absenteeism, but also to better pupil performance.
And in Uganda the government, appalled that money meant for schools was not reaching them, took to publicising how much was being allotted, using radio and newspapers. Leakage was dramatically reduced. The World Bank hopes to bring such innovations to the notice of other governments during the summit, if it can. For if the drive against poverty is to succeed, it will owe more to such ideas and their wider use than to targets set at UN-sponsored summits.

Wiggle room

The IMF offers indebted governments some reassurance

ONE consequence of the deepest recession since the Depression has been the biggest peacetime build-up of public debt the rich world has ever seen. Some reckon that the debt position of many rich countries is now unsustainable. It is a measure of just how nervous people have become about the mountain of debt that the IMF—not usually known for taking doveish views—concluded in two papers released on September 1st that there is too much pessimism about public finances.
The IMF argues that despite historically high debt-to-GDP ratios, many countries still have room for fiscal manoeuvre. Typically, the debate on the point at which a country’s debt burden spirals out of control has tried to identify a single debt-to-GDP threshold, above which things are no longer sustainable. The fund’s economists argue that a universal debt limit does not make sense.
That is because countries tend to respond to high debt ratios by cutting deficits but vary in their ability to do so. Each country will have a debt limit that is partly a function of its own history of fiscal consolidation. According to the IMF economists’ calculations, this theoretical limit is much higher, even for highly indebted countries like Britain and America, than their current or projected near-term debt ratios (see chart).
The fund cautions that countries cannot afford to let debt build up until it reaches those levels. Rolling over their debt may become increasingly difficult well before the theoretical limit is reached, something to which Greece and others can testify. The fiscal positions of Britain or America may not yet be unsustainable, but they are not comfortable.
The fund also reckons that the risk that countries with onerous debt levels will inevitably default is also “significantly overestimated”. This finding is partly based on its analysis of 36 cases since 1991 where countries saw their bond spreads soar. In 29 of these episodes there was no eventual default. It also reckons that because the principal problem facing today’s highly indebted countries is not high interest payments but high primary budget deficits, restructuring debt would not help much anyway. Whether these arguments will count for anything with investors remains to be seen.

Data birth

Fifty years after the dawn of empirical financial economics, is anyone the wiser?

IT ALL began with a phone call, from a banker at Merrill Lynch who wanted to know how investors in shares had performed relative to investors in other assets. I don’t know, but if you gave me $50,000 I could find out, replied Jim Lorie, a dean at the University of Chicago’s business school, in so many words. The banker, Louis Engel, soon agreed to stump up the cash, and more. The result, in 1960, was the launch of the university’s Centre for Research in Security Prices. Half a century later CRSP (pronounced “crisp”) data are everywhere. They provide the foundation of at least one-third of all empirical research in finance over the past 40 years, according to a presentation at a symposium held this month. They probably influenced much of the rest. Whether that is an entirely good thing has become a matter of debate among economists since the financial crisis.
Compiling the CRSP data was an arduous process in what were then the early days of computing. Up to 3m pieces of information on all the shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange between 1926 and 1960 were transferred from paper in the exchange’s archive to magnetic tape. A lot of time was spent adjusting prices to take account of share splits, dividends, delistings and so on. Lorie and his co-researcher, Lawrence Fisher, chose January 1926 as the start date because they wanted the data to span at least one complete business cycle.
When the two economists published the first study based on these data in 1964, they reported that the annual compound return on the shares over the entire 35-year period was (depending on the tax status of the investor) between 6.8% and 9%. Acknowledging that good data on the performance of other assets were not available, the study claimed that the rate of return on shares was “substantially higher than for alternative investment media”, providing the first empirical support for the still popular idea that shares outperform over the long run. Fisher and Lorie also observed that many people choose to invest in assets with lower returns due to “the essentially conservative nature of those investors and the extent of their concern about the risk of loss inherent in common stocks”. Economists today call the amount of extra return that investors need to compensate them for this additional risk the “equity risk premium”, although they differ greatly on how big investors should expect it to be.
After that there was no stopping the love affair between financial economists and number-crunching. Myron Scholes, now a Nobel laureate, became director of CRSP in 1974 and ensured the database was both kept up-to-date and made readily available to academic economists everywhere. In turn, this resource became ever more useful as computing power became more pervasive and affordable. The CRSP database has since been expanded to include bonds, property, some commodities, mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. It has been replicated across the world.
One of the earliest uses of the CRSP data was by Eugene Fama, an economist at the University of Chicago, to support his “efficient-market hypothesis”. He found that over time share prices tended to follow a “random walk”. Markets are efficient, he said, because all relevant information is reflected in share prices at any given moment, meaning there are no predictable movements in prices for smart investors to exploit. Mr Fama did concede that there was some evidence of temporary short-term predictability in share prices, however. That caveat has spawned a vast number of papers based on discovering such “anomalies” through data mining. In theory, such anomalies are potentially lucrative for investors, but as believers in efficient markets observe with glee, it seems that no sooner are such anomalies discovered and reported in journals than they typically disappear.
For Mr Scholes empirical finance has barely scraped the surface of what will one day be known about asset pricing. The amount of research in this area is still growing rapidly. Fashionable areas of study include the effect of liquidity on asset prices and the impact of automated trading programs designed to take advantage of mispricing of securities. Partly to accommodate the boom in articles that report the results of this number-crunching, academic economic journals have proliferated, rising from around 80 when CRSP was founded to about 800 today. The sheer volume of material means that financial economists are becoming increasingly specialised.

The grandpa principle

That may have costs as well as benefits. Some economists worry that much of this statistical analysis is nothing more than noise that drowns out serious thinking about the big questions, such as why the financial system nearly collapsed two years ago and how a repeat can be avoided. With the creation of the CRSP database economists suddenly believed that “finance had become scientific,” says Robert Shiller, an economist at Yale University and a longtime sceptic about the efficient-market hypothesis. Conventional ideas about investing and financial markets—and about their vulnerabilities—seemed out-of-date to the new empiricists, says Mr Shiller, who worries that academic departments are “creating idiot savants, who get a sense of authority from work that contains lots of data”. To have seen the financial crisis coming, he argues, it would have been better to “go back to old-fashioned readings of history, studying institutions and laws. We should have talked to grandpa.”
Mr Scholes counterpunches that the usefulness of this empirical analysis is proven by the fact that demand for it continues to grow. At CRSP’s 50th-anniversary symposium plans were unveiled to publish new indices for large-cap and small-cap shares, as well as for growth and value stocks. These indices, CRSP claims, will be more academically rigorous and cheaper than existing ones. For believers in the efficiency of markets, that should be enough to ensure CRSP’s continuing success.